A Comparison of Morality Judgments in Polytheistic and Monotheistic Religious Traditions: An Argument for Acceptance Morality in Reconstructed Polytheism
by Micheál O’Miadhachain (September 2008)
I have wanted to write an essay comparing morality judgments in modern polytheistic traditions to those found in modern monotheistic traditions for some time. In terms of this brief essay, I define “modern polytheistic traditions” as those reconstructed or rediscovered religious traditions and spirituality which derive from pre-Christian European religious beliefs that center around a “tribe” or community, with personal involvement and dedication to that tribe or community and including those who identify their deities as distinct and individual entities and not as expressions or aspects of another greater deity or concept. Such expressions are currently found in many religious paths such as Asatru and Heathenry and are beginning to develop in Celtic Reconstructionist Pagan and Slavic Reconstructionist paths. I also define monotheism, exclusively in this essay, as the form of monotheistic worship, foreign to ancient European peoples, as introduced and enforced by Christian missionaries and which eventually came to replace pagan religious expressions, as the common dualistic religious expression in European culture and which believes in the existence of a single omniscient, all-powerful and ever present deity to the exclusion and disbelief in all others.
In comparing the basis of moral judgments for these two religious traditions, I would like to suggest a model similar to that proposed by the religious studies scholar Michael Barnes. Barnes essentially takes Kohlberg’s stages of moral development and assigns them to one of Bellah’s stages of religious development. Barnes does not use the same exact language or terminology as Kohlberg, but the essence is similar. Barnes basically assigns a taboo and acceptance morality to primitive religions, an acceptance and taboo morality to archaic religions, a universal laws morality to historic religions and a basic value morality for modern religions[i] [ii]. These specific types of moralities do not necessarily coincide with Kohlberg’s stages of moral development but essentially taboo morality may be associated with pre-conventional levels, acceptance morality with conventional levels and universal laws and basic value moralities to post-conventional levels as described in Kohlberg’s works.[iii]
Now, I do not believe that this system is without faults. This particular system, which essentially places developmental levels of morality onto developmental levels of religions, implies that certain religious systems cannot move past certain basic types of morality. It also suggests that a religion is not fully evolved until it reaches the pinnacle of the “modern” religion and that morality is a developmental absolute and so too cannot reach its pinnacle until it evolves and develops into what is termed “basic value morality”. Implicit also is the idea that since moral judgment is seen as a developmental process, that one form of morality cannot overlap with another form of morality as one stage must develop from the previous stage.
From a less developmental perspective, I would argue that different types of moral judgments can exist within a group or person at any one time. For example, an individual may not wish to harm someone because he/she believes it to be wrong as harming the person would cause that other individual suffering and that suffering is not good. However, the same individual may simultaneously take into account that the act of hitting someone and harming him/her may cause the individual difficulty and punishment from authorities which may wind up in arrest and incarceration. This exhibits two different types of moral judgment acting upon the same end result – not hitting the other individual.
Similarly, religious traditions, may use a variety of moral judgments. For example, the Christian who does not harm another because he/she must “turn the other cheek” but also worries about engaging in a mortal sin and thus being condemned to hell is also acting on two separate types of morality as is the pagan who does not break his oath because of his personal honor but because he also fears offending the God to whom it was sworn.
However, in terms of the argument presented here, I will deal exclusively with the idea that acceptance morality is assigned to “archaic” religions and universal laws morality is associated with “historic” religions. [iv] As noted before, I do not believe that other forms of morality judgments are absent from these religions, but I do believe that the essential core of the morality judgments of these religions are as noted. I would also like to mention, that instead of the terminology “archaic” and “historic” used by Barnes and modeled after Bellah [v], I would prefer to use the terms “polytheism” and “monotheism” respectively as Barnes himself seems to equate them with each other in terms of the definition of each system as noted earlier in the essay[vi].
So, given the argument that acceptance morality is associated with polytheistic traditions (in terms of our original definition of the term) and universal laws morality is associated with monotheistic traditions, it now becomes imperative to discuss what the differences in these types of morality are and how they effect the followers of these two belief systems.
Barnes defines acceptance morality in terms of archaic belief systems is a belief that:
“…the virtues that are considered praiseworthy are the group virtues of loyalty to one’s own people, dedication to the causes of the group, and trustworthiness and honesty in dealing with others in the same group.”[vii]
Barnes also comments that:
“A stress on honor is a major manifestation of acceptance morality….. Honor even becomes a sacred thing, to be guarded and protected against anything that might profane it….. No person is worse than the coward, who places personal safety above the needs of those to whom he or she should be loyal.” [viii]
Such examples are easily found in the mythology of many of the native, but extinct, polytheistic European religions and cultures. Tales from the Welsh and Irish to that of the Norse and Germanic peoples, abound in details of a sense of honor and loyalty to one’s group or tribe. Myths also abound in tales of those that happened to fail in these virtues. Such loyalty to one’s group and tribe is also present in many modern day Asatru and Heathen organizations and is beginning to grow in small groups of individuals who call themselves Gaelic Traditionalists and Celtic Reconstructionist Pagans. Such organizations look at their religious path as being made up of spiritual practices, containing a common construct, that are shared closely with family members and adopted kin. Groups are formed which represent a “tribe” system and religious duties, spiritual practices and socialization occur within that tribe and bonds of loyalty and oaths to one another and to the Gods and Goddesses of the tribe hold the tribe together. Moral judgments, in a truly ideal situation, would then reflect this loyalty to the tribe. Members of the tribe would watch out for one another, help and assist one another, make sacrifices for one another and attempt to genuinely support one another in such a fashion that many families do. In essence, the tribe becomes like the extended family. Religious observances and beliefs, moral judgments, orthopraxy and such may extend to the tribe only and are not meant to pertain to all individuals.
In a larger sense, polytheists also have the distinct pleasure of believing in other Gods. Many modern polytheists see a world full of Gods and Goddesses, and respect those deities, but choose only to honor those from a particular pantheon and in a particular cultural style that expresses the needs and desires of the group. For example, Asatru honor the Norse and Germanic Gods and Goddesses with a specific set of observances and rituals, while Celtic Reconstructionist Pagans do the same for a variety of Celtic pantheons. However, those who honor Odin do not deny the existence of Lugh and those that honor Brighid do not deny the existence of Freya. They simply choose to honor the Gods only of their tribe and in the customs associated with their tribe.
This is in contrast to universal laws morality which Barnes defines as a system that:
“insists, however, that regardless of what people think, there is as a matter of fact just one true and universal moral laws which people ought to obey.”[ix]
This system is the dominant moral system in many of today’s monotheistic religions, particularly some branches of Christianity, Islam and Judaism. Monotheistic religions tend to emphasize their own moral judgments and God as the only way to eternal happiness and knowledge of the numinous to the exclusion of others. For example, many Christian, Islamic and Jewish authorities teach that acts between homosexuals are inherently disordered. This is taken from their interpretation of their holy scripture and traditions. However, these organizations do not believe that this judgment only pertains to the individuals in their specific traditions but to all of humanity and seek to impose through enforcement, both morally and civilly, these judgments on the whole of humanity. Such examples are common in today’s society whether it be the aforementioned discussion of homosexuality or whether it be reproductive rights and birth control, euthanasia, stem cell research and etc. In essence, unlike acceptance morality, which only pertains to the group that has formulated the specific moral judgment, universal laws morality pertains to the entire human population whether or not they belong to the group which formulated the moral judgment or not. In a sense, this greatly diminishes our rights as individuals and is very contrary to western ideals of democracy and freedom.
I would therefore argue that acceptance morality is in fact a higher ideal than that of universal laws morality in that in the former, one respects the individual and inherent rights of others and does not seek to impose outside moral judgments upon them unless the individual so chooses to belong to the group which has established a particular moral judgment.
Acceptance morality, however, is not without criticism. Opponents may argue that such morality fosters racism and the intolerance of individuals who are not members of the group. I would argue, however, that in a modern construct of acceptance morality, other factors do come into play. In many pagan reconstructionist and polytheistic movements, which this essay particularly addresses, added virtues of hospitality and respect of the practices of those who honor other deities are additional factors. As noted before, polytheists do not deny the existence of other deities outside of their own construct, but simply do not choose to honor them as they do those deities of their respective group. However, this acknowledgement allows polytheists to respect the other groups and their practices relating to their particular deities. Therefore, a polytheistic can respect a Christian who is essentially a follower and worshipper of Yahweh, just as much as he/she would accept and respect an Odinist and does not have the world view that these individuals are practicing things wrongly or are being mislead in their religious beliefs or are honoring false gods and idols. They simply acknowledge the fact that there are other deities other than their own and there are other ways of honoring them and this is very much in the spirit of acceptance morality – in other words acceptance by the group of only what is expected by that particular group while not necessarily extending the need to have others outside the group accept the group’s morality and teaching on such. This is in stark contrast to the idea proposed by monotheists that all other gods are false and that therefore they have a duty to “save” the eternal souls of others who worship these false deities by converting them to the faith which they believe is the only true faith. In a sense, it is monotheism and its associated universal laws morality that supports an environment of intolerance of others.
One must also take into account the modern view of “tribe” or group in many pagan reconstructionist groups. We no longer live in a tribal society as did our ancestors which is based entirely on a homogenous mixture of individuals of the same race and cultural backgrounds. Modern day pagan reconstructionism, is for the majority a chosen path and one that one is not born into as our ancestors might have been.
Reconstructionism is not an attempt to turn back the time to the “olden days” but rather to discern how the religious culture would have evolved over the centuries if it had no been forced into extinction by the coming of foreign religions and missionaries. Most reconstructionists realize that Celtic, Germanic or Slavic practices, had they existed into modern times, would be different from those which were practiced centuries ago. One of these differences, particularly in relation to today’s global society, is the idea of the “tribe” or “group”. While many pagan reconstructionist paths are centered around a particular culture, the majority of groups following those paths do not restrict involvement in the group to those whose ancestors may have been part of that particular culture. In a sense, they are hospitable to individuals of other cultural backgrounds who may be interested in their group and joining the “culture” of the group. This is an essential point regarding the idea of hospitality alluded to earlier. Some groups may urge that individuals of different ancestries explore the backgrounds of their own ancestors first, but many do not object to the inclusion of individuals of varying backgrounds. This is not to say that there are not organizations which go to the extremes of acceptance morality and propagate an environment and culture of hate of outsiders, but this is generally not the norm. The norm is mutual respect of those outside the respective groups who mean no harm and who respect the groups’ right to self-govern their own morality and religious attitudes without imposing upon them a universal laws morality and urging the acceptance of the outside groups’ morality and religious expression.
By the coming of the monotheistic faiths and their universal laws morality, polytheism was essentially wiped out in the west. Through an adherence to universal laws morality, monotheistic faiths, particularly Christianity, saw it as necessary to destroy what they believed to be the false morality, religious expression and culture of all those they encountered in order to bring them into what they believed to be the “universal” morality, religious expression and cultural identity. Such an attitude, instead of fostering individuality, heterogeneity, respect of foreign cultures and beliefs, and the rights of the individual fostered instead an intolerant view of the world where homogeneity of culture and religious expression was the only acceptable outcome.
Acceptance morality in polytheistic faiths is not, in fact, an inferior or “undeveloped” morality, but is instead a morality far superior in respecting the rights of others to self govern their own religious and moral expressions as it fosters an environment of respect of others through a belief in other Gods and the religious and moral expressions suited to those Gods and cultures. It also respects the decisions of those involved in the modern construct of “tribe” or community to belong to that organization of their own free will and also their ability to leave that group if their individual moral judgments do not match that of the group as through a rejection of universal laws morality, those groups do not believe that there way is the only true expression of a knowledge of the numinous.
References:
Barnes, Michael H, In the Presence of Mystery: An Introduction to the Story of Human Religiousness (revised), Twenty-Third Publications: 1994
Barnes, Michael H. Stages of Thought and Cultural Evolution, Oxford: 2000
Kohlberg, Lawrence. Essays on Moral Development, Vol I: The Philosophy of Moral Development, Harper and Row: 1981.
[i] Barnes (1994)
[ii] Barnes (2000)
[iii] Kohlberg (1981)
[iv] Barnes (1994)
[v] Barnes (1994)
[vi] Barnes (1994)
[vii] Barnes (1994: pg 169)
[viii] Barnes (1994: pg 169)
[ix] Barnes (1994: pg 173)